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Germany Has 760,700 Permitted Homes. So Why Are We Not Building Them?

The housing shortage is usually framed as a planning problem. The stock of approved but unfinished homes suggests that financing, construction economics and execution have become at least as important.

Acquirepad Research ·

  • 206,600 homes completed in 2025
  • 760,700 approved but unfinished at end-2025
  • 307,200 of the backlog already under construction
  • 35,700 permits expired in 2025
  • 27 months average approval-to-completion time

Germany completed 206,600 homes in 2025, 18% fewer than in 2024 and the lowest annual number since 2012. [1] That is bad enough. The more revealing number is the backlog: 760,700 homes had planning approval but were not finished at the end of the year. Only 307,200 of them were actually under construction. [1]

The housing shortage is therefore not just a story about projects failing to receive permission. Hundreds of thousands of units already have permission and still have not become homes.

Exhibit 1. German completions fell sharply after the 2020 peak
Year / periodCompleted homesContext
2009159,000Post-financial-crisis low
2020306,400Recent peak
2021-2023about 294,000 per yearPlateau
2024251,900-14.4% YoY
2025206,600-18.0% YoY

Source: Destatis completion releases. [1] [2]

The backlog is not the same thing as future supply

At 2025's completion rate, the 760,700-unit backlog is equivalent to roughly 3.7 years of output. It would be a mistake to treat those units as a guaranteed pipeline. The backlog includes projects at very different stages, and Destatis does not know how many still-valid permits are no longer being pursued. [1]

The number of permits that formally expired gives one signal. In 2025, 35,700 housing permits expired, the highest figure since 2002. That was about a quarter more than in 2024 and roughly half more than in 2022 or 2023. [1]

A permit can therefore be economically dead long before it is administratively dead.

Permitting is improving faster than completions

This is what makes the current cycle interesting. Housing permits rose again in 2025 after three annual declines. Destatis recorded 238,500 approvals, 10.8% more than in 2024. [3] The momentum strengthened in early 2026: 104,700 homes were approved from January through May, 15.4% more than a year earlier. Approvals in new multifamily buildings increased 18.9% to 56,100 units. [4]

If the bottleneck were primarily administrative, this should be the beginning of a supply recovery. It may be. But the transmission from permit to completion has become slower and more expensive.

Time itself has become part of the development cost

The average period from approval to completion for new residential buildings reached 27 months in 2025, up from 20 months in 2020. [1] Seven extra months affect a development in several ways: interest accrues for longer, revenue starts later, equity is tied up, the project is exposed to more cost inflation and the exit market has more time to move.

Longer duration can kill a marginal project without any single dramatic cost increase. This is why planning reform and financing reform cannot be separated. A project that is technically viable over 20 months may not be viable over 27.

Construction costs are still moving in the wrong direction

Residential construction prices rose another 5.0% year on year in May 2026. Office construction prices rose 5.2% and industrial-building prices 5.0%. [5] The current rates are much lower than the double-digit inflation of 2021-2023, but the level shift remains embedded in the cost base.

The key asymmetry is that property values repriced when interest rates rose, while replacement cost did not fall back to its pre-shock level. Developers therefore face a capital stack in which land, hard cost, financing cost, required equity return and exit yield can all demand more than the achievable rent can support.

The useful metric is not permits. It is required rent.

For an investor, the question is not whether a project can legally be built. It is the rent required to make the project financeable.

Exhibit 2. A better way to read the permitted pipeline
InputUnderwriting question
Land and acquisition costsWhat basis is already sunk and what must a new buyer pay?
Hard and soft construction costsWhat does the building cost at today's tender prices?
Construction durationHow long is equity and debt outstanding before rent starts?
Debt termsWhat leverage, margin and amortisation are available?
Required equity returnWhat margin or yield-on-cost does the sponsor require?
Stabilised rent and exit yieldDoes the local market support the required economics?

Acquirepad Research underwriting framework.

The gap between required rent and achievable rent is the development viability gap. That metric can explain why a city can have rising rents, a housing shortage and a large permitted pipeline while construction still falls.

Existing stock benefits from the bottleneck, but not without political risk

For owners of standing multifamily assets, weak construction reduces competing supply. The Bundesbank's new commercial property price index showed prices of institutionally owned multifamily assets up 2.2% year on year in Q1 2026, continuing the recovery that began in 2024. [6]

The same economics that support existing values also intensify affordability pressure. If new supply stays low and rents rise, political appetite for intervention increases. Good property fundamentals and good shareholder economics are therefore not identical in residential real estate.

Energy performance creates another split. Banks are already differentiating credit conditions more favourably toward high-performance buildings and more restrictively toward low-performance buildings. [7] Standing stock is protected from development risk, but not from capex and financing risk.

What required rent means in numbers

A simple yield-on-cost sensitivity makes the development bottleneck concrete. If total stabilised development cost is EUR 5,000 per sqm of lettable area, a 4.5% gross yield on cost requires EUR 225 per sqm of annual rent, or EUR 18.75 per sqm per month before allowing for vacancy, operating leakage or incentives. At EUR 6,000 per sqm, the same 4.5% hurdle requires EUR 22.50 per sqm per month.

Exhibit 3. Small cost changes can move the required rent materially
Total development costGross yield-on-cost hurdleRequired annual rentRequired monthly rent
EUR 4,500 / sqm4.5%EUR 202.50 / sqmEUR 16.88 / sqm
EUR 5,000 / sqm4.5%EUR 225.00 / sqmEUR 18.75 / sqm
EUR 5,500 / sqm4.5%EUR 247.50 / sqmEUR 20.63 / sqm
EUR 6,000 / sqm4.5%EUR 270.00 / sqmEUR 22.50 / sqm

Illustrative Acquirepad Research sensitivity. Required rent = total development cost x gross yield-on-cost hurdle / 12. It excludes vacancy and operating leakage and is not a city-level rent forecast.

The purpose of the sensitivity is not to suggest one national hurdle rate. It shows why a permit can remain unused even while market rents rise: when the cost base and financing terms move faster than achievable rents, the project can remain economically out of the money.

What would change our view?

The capital-bottleneck thesis would weaken if the permit recovery quickly translated into starts and completions, approval-to-completion times fell back toward 2020 levels, construction inflation slowed materially and financing conditions improved enough to close project viability gaps. A large fall in land prices could have the same effect in some markets.

The changed belief should be this: Germany does not only need more permissions. It needs more of the projects that already have permission to become financeable.

Methodology and limitations

The analysis uses Destatis completions, permits, permit-backlog, expiry, duration and construction-price releases, supplemented by Bundesbank property-price and lending evidence. The 760,700-unit backlog contains projects at different stages and should not be read as deliverable future supply. The required-rent table is a transparent sensitivity, not a project appraisal; actual feasibility depends on land basis, construction specification, financing, vacancy, operating costs, subsidies, tax, developer margin and exit assumptions.

Notes and sources

Numbers in the article are drawn from the sources below. Interpretive statements and scenario analysis are Acquirepad Research unless otherwise stated.

  1. [1] Statistisches Bundesamt, 18.0% fewer homes completed in 2025, 22 May 2026.Source
  2. [2] Statistisches Bundesamt, 14.4% fewer homes completed in 2024, 23 May 2025.Source
  3. [3] Statistisches Bundesamt, 10.8% more housing permits in 2025, 18 February 2026.Source
  4. [4] Statistisches Bundesamt, Housing permits May 2026, 17 July 2026.Source
  5. [5] Statistisches Bundesamt, Construction prices May 2026, 10 July 2026.Source
  6. [6] Deutsche Bundesbank, Commercial property price index, Q1 2026.Source
  7. [7] Deutsche Bundesbank, July results of the Bank Lending Survey in Germany, 21 July 2026.Source